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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a well settled principle of law that one must demonstrate the
deprivation of a federally protected right, whether it be a constitutional or
federal statutory right,2 to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 In
the land use context, plaintiffs generally bring section 1983 claims based
on the deprivation of the constitutional right to receive substantive due
process.4 This article reviews and explores the implications of the Third
Circuit’s recent decision in United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v.
Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003), which proposes a
deviation from the judicial standard applicable to establish the
deprivation of substantive due process for a section 1983 claim in the
context of land use challenges. The proposed “shocks the conscience”
standard, with its genesis in non-deliberative governmental contexts, may
prove difficult to apply in the traditional land use setting.
II. UNITED ARTISTS AND THE STANDARD TO ESTABLISH DEPRIVATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. The Established Standard
Until United Artists, the Third Circuit’s test to establish the
deprivation of substantive due process in the land use context was well
settled; the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the municipal land
decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or tainted by improper motive.”5 The
2
Not all claims of constitutional and federal statute violations are actionable under a
section 1983 claim. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989)
(holding that the Constitution’s supremacy clause does not create actionable rights
enforceable under section 1983); see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997)
(holding that federal statutes are not actionable under a section 1983 claim unless the
federal statute creates an enforceable right.).
3
The United States Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights statute,
on April 20, 1871 to act as a guardian of people’s federal rights, and thus protect people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether the action is executive,
legislative, or judicial. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); see also Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
Essentially, section 1983 creates a private right of action to seek redress for the
deprivation of federal rights. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. 225.
4
This constitutional right arises from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In pertinent part, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) (seminal case); see also
Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Nicholas v.
Pennsylvania State University, 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000)) (recognizing “improper
motives” as valid due process test); Woodwind Estates Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118

2005]

CONSCIENCE SHOCKING TEST

103

Third Circuit based this test on the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was “intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government.”6 In applying this test, the Third Circuit routinely vacated
the issuance of summary judgments “where the evidence at least
plausibly showed that a government took actions against the developer
for indefensible reasons unrelated to the merits of the zoning dispute.”7
For example, in Bello v. Walker, the plaintiffs obtained the
municipality’s approval for their five-stage subdivision building plan.8
After receiving building permits for and completing stage one of the
plan, the plaintiffs submitted an application to the municipality’s code
enforcement officer (the “Official”) by which they requested the issuance
of building permits to allow them to commence construction of stage five
of the plan.9 The Official, however, denied the plaintiffs’ application,
alleging that it was improper because the plaintiffs sought to construct
stage five of the plan prior to the construction of stages two through
four.10 The Official asserted this as the basis of his decision despite the
fact that the plaintiffs had never agreed to develop the plan in numerical
order.11
In response, the plaintiffs filed a section 1983 action against the
municipality and the Official (collectively, the “Defendants”) claiming
that, inter alia, the deprivation of substantive due process because a
number of municipal officials improperly influenced the Defendants’
decision to deny the building permits.12 Thereafter, the Defendants filed,
and the district court granted, a motion for summary judgment.13
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision,
holding that substantive due process is violated where the denial of a
building permit is based upon arbitrary, irrational or improperly
motivated governmental action, such as a deliberate indifference to the
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1983 claim for deprivation of substantive due process is
established where the denial of a development plan was “made in bad faith or was based
on improper motive.”).
6
Bello, 840 F.2d at 1128 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)); see
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (holding that
the Due Process Clause provides the “right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning
actions.”).
7
Woodwind Estates, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 124.
8
Bello, 840 F.2d at 1126.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1127.
13
Id.
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law.14 Specifically, the court stated that the plaintiffs presented sufficient
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that certain
municipality council members “improperly interfered with the process by
which the municipality issued building permits, and that they did so for
partisan political or personal reasons unrelated to the merits of the
application for permits.”15 The court concluded that “[t]hese actions can
have no relationship to any legitimate governmental objective, and
[accordingly], are sufficient to establish a substantive due process
violation actionable under § 1983.”16
B. The United Artists Standard
In its recent decision in United Artists, the Third Circuit appeared to
stray from the established “arbitrary or improper motive” test by
applying a new, more stringent “shocks the conscience” test.17
1. An Analysis of United Artists
In United Artists, a movie theater owner and developer (“United
Artists”), attempting to develop a movie theater in an area that could
only support one theater, filed a section 1983 claim with the district court
against Warrington Township (the “Township”) and the Warrington
Township Board of Supervisors in both their official and personal
capacities (the “Supervisors”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) alleging
that the Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by intentionally
delaying the development approval process in order to obtain an impact
fee offered by a competing movie theater developer (“Regal Cinema”).18
To establish its claim, United Artists provided evidence demonstrating
that: (1) the Township attempted to unlawfully change the terms of its
approval of United Artists’ preliminary development plan which forced
United Artists to file suit in the Court of Common Pleas to have the
unlawful condition stricken and (2) the Supervisors took fourteen months
to approve the United Artists’ preliminary development plan, tabling its
vote on three separate occasions because United Artists refused to pay an
impact fee, while only taking one month to approve the Regal Cinema

14

Id. at 1129.
Id.
16
Id. at 1129-30.
17
United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 400
(3d Cir. 2003).
18
Id. at 396.
15
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preliminary development plan, a plan offered by a developer willing to
pay the impact fee.19
In response, the Supervisors asserted qualified immunity defenses
and moved for summary judgment.20 The district court denied the
Supervisors’ motion with respect to the substantive due process claim
and an appeal to a panel of the Third Circuit followed.21 The panel
vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case instructing the
district court to analyze each of the Supervisors’ qualified immunity
defenses individually. In a footnote, the panel stated that it was
expressing no opinion at that time as to whether a recent Supreme Court
decision, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), required
United Artists to establish that the Supervisors’ conduct “shocked the
conscience” to demonstrate the deprivation of substantive due process in
the land use context.22
On remand, and after individually analyzing each of the
Supervisors’ qualified immunity defenses, the district court again denied
the Supervisors’ motion for summary judgment.23 Additionally, the
district court responded to the panel’s reference to the “shock the
conscience” test stating that “the shocks the conscience and arbitrary or
improper motive tests are essentially the same.”24 The district court
further noted that a recent Third Circuit opinion, Woodwind Estates, Ltd.
v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000), suggested that Lewis did not
alter the well established “arbitrary or improper motive” test.25
Thereafter, the Supervisors again appealed to the Third Circuit.26
The Third Circuit, in a two-to-one decision authored by the
Honorable Samuel A. Alito,27 remanded the case to the district court,
holding that Lewis superseded the “arbitrary or improper motive” test
and that prior to its determination of whether the Supervisors may assert
qualified immunity defenses, the district court must determine whether
United Artists had alleged the deprivation of substantive due process
19

Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. (citing Woodwind Estates, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 118 (Sloviter, Roth and Cowen,
JJ.)); see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
26
United Artists, 316 F.3d at 396.
27
The United Artists panel consisted of the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Robert E.
Cowen and Alan D. Lourie. Judge Louire, a Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation, joined Judge Alito in the decision
and Judge Cowen dissented.
20
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under the new “shocks the conscience” test.28 The court stated that Lewis
mandated the application of the “shocks the conscience” test by holding
that executive action violates substantive due process “only when it ‘can
properly be characterized as . . . conscience shocking, in a constitutional
sense.’”29 The court further ratified the Lewis Court’s position that “only
the most egregious official conduct” violates the “shocks the conscience
test.”30
The court rejected the district court’s argument that the “arbitrary or
improper motive” and “shocks the conscience” tests were essentially the
same, stating that “shocks the conscience” test encompasses only “the
most egregious conduct” while the term “improper” sweeps much more
broadly. Additionally, the court rejected the district court’s position that,
in Woodwind Estates, the Third Circuit held that Lewis had not altered
prior Third Circuit law.31 The court reasoned that because Woodwind
Estates makes no mention of Lewis, the fact that it applied the “arbitrary
or improper motive” test cannot alone establish the Third Circuit’s
rejection of Lewis in the land use context.32
The court concluded that the determination of whether conduct
“shocks the conscience” will depend on the facts of the particular case
because “deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not
be so patently egregious in another.”33
2. An Analysis of the Rationale Underlying United Artists
a. The Unique Circumstances in Lewis
The United Artists court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
opinion set forth in Lewis provided the basis for its decision to replace
the “arbitrary or improper motive” test with the “shocks the conscience”
test in the land use context.34 Specifically, the United Artists court stated
that “[the] cases [applying the “arbitrary or improper motive” test] . . .
cannot be reconciled with Lewis’s explanation of substantive due process
analysis.”35 Accordingly, it is prudent to analyze the U.S. Supreme

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400.
Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850).
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 399 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850).
United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400.
Id.
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Court’s decision in Lewis36 to understand the rationale behind the
adoption of the “shocks the conscience” test.
Lewis, in fact, involved very different circumstances of alleged
municipal improprieties. In Lewis, the U.S. Supreme Court “granted
certiorari . . . to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard
of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating due
process in a pursuit case.”37 Specifically, Lewis involved a section 1983
claim by which the parents of a decedent alleged that a police officer
unconstitutionally deprived the deceased’s substantive due process right
to life as the result of a high speed police chase.38 The U.S. Supreme
Court examined the appropriate standard to apply to allegations that an
executive branch official violated substantive due process and
determined that the fundamental principle of due process was “protection
against arbitrary action.”39
The Court stated that “only the most egregious official conduct can
be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”40 The Court
considered the “arbitrary or improper motive” test in the context of a
“deliberate indifference” and found the term “deliberate indifference” an
inappropriate concept in the context of a situation where actual
deliberation was not practical, such as where a municipal official was
found to make a split-second decision while chasing another vehicle.41
The Lewis Court, under these circumstances, concluded that “the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by
executive action only where it is ‘conscience shocking in a constitutional
sense.’”42
b. The Extension of the Lewis Standard in United Artists
The Third Circuit’s extension of the Lewis “shocks the conscience”
test to the land use context is potentially far reaching and, at least in the
opinion of Judge Cowen’s ardent dissent, unwarranted. The majority
opinion in United Artists expressed its conclusion that it is appropriate to
apply the same culpable standard applied to an executive official in
exigent circumstances where the official could not deliberate to
36
Opinion by Souter, J., in which Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy, Breyer and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.
37
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 839.
38
Id. at 837.
39
Id. (quoting Wolff v. Mc Donnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
40
Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
41
Id. at 851 n.11.
42
Id. at 847 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 128).
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situations where, after consideration, an executive official has issued a
calculated and deliberate decision, stating “[o]n the merits, we hold that
Lewis has superseded prior decisions of our Court holding that a plaintiff
asserting that a municipal land-use decision violated substantive due
process need only show that the municipal officials acted with an
‘improper motive.’”43
The extension of the “shocks the conscience” test may actually be
inconsistent with the carefully worded limitations noted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Lewis.44 Indeed, the Lewis Court expressly stated:
“[t]he issue in this case is whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death
through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed
automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender.”45 In
reaching its decision, the Lewis Court carefully pointed out that although
the “shocks the conscience” test is appropriate for situations where the
state actor does not have time to deliberate, the deliberative indifference
(“arbitrary or improper motive”) test is “sensibly employed . . . when
actual deliberation is practical.”46 Furthermore, the Lewis Court’s
application of the “shocks the conscience” test to exigent situations,
where deliberation was not practical, was consistent with Third Circuit
precedent, which also applied the “shocks the conscience” test to exigent
situations while applying the “arbitrary or improper motive” test to the
land use context.47
The United Artists court’s expansion of the application of the
“shocks the conscience” test to the land use context was inconsistent
with not only Third Circuit precedent prior to Lewis but also to Third
Circuit decisions rendered subsequent to Lewis, which not only
acknowledged Lewis, but appeared to harmonize the two standards. In
Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, a post-Lewis Third Circuit
decision, Judge Alito, the same judge who subsequently authored the
United Artists decision, authored a unanimous decision by which the
Third Circuit concluded that the “arbitrary or improper motive” and
“shocks the conscience” tests are appropriate substantive due process

43

United Artists, 316 F.3d at 394.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
47
Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 953, at *13-17
(3d Cir. 2003) (applying the “shocks the conscience” test where a state actor had to act
with urgency); see Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing the
“improper motive” test as valid Due Process standard in the land use context).
44
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tests.48 Further, in Khodara, Judge Alito again authored a unanimous
decision by which the Third Circuit49 expressly acknowledged Lewis and
concluded that the “arbitrary or improper motive” test was the proper
standard to determine a substantive due process violation in the land use
context.50 In Woodwind Estates, a case also decided after Lewis, the
Third Circuit concluded that the “arbitrary or improper motive” test was
the proper standard to determine the deprivation of substantive due
process in the land use context.51
Given the limiting language in Lewis, and the Third Circuit’s initial
recognition that distinct standards were appropriate based on whether the
governmental actor had time to deliberate, Judge Cowen’s strongly
worded dissent is not surprising. Judge Cowen, anticipating the inherent
difficulty in applying the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use
context, noted:
[T]ossing every substantive Due Process egg into the nebulous
and highly subjective “shocks the conscience” basket is unwise.
It leaves the door ajar for intentional and flagrant abuses of
authority by those who hold the sacred trust of local public office
to go unchecked. “Shocks the conscience” is a useful standard in
high speed police misconduct cases which tend to stir out
emotions and yield immediate reaction. But it is less appropriate,
and does not translate well, to the more mundane world of local
land use decisions, where lifeless property (as opposed to bodily
invasions) are involved. In this regard, it appears rather difficult
to analogize the intentional and illegal denial of a building permit
to the forced pumping of the human stomach, the infamous fact
pattern that begat “shocks the conscience” as a term of
constitutional significance.52

Judge Cowen further warned:
[Applying the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use
context] is the jurisprudential equivalent of a square peg in a
48
See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2000). The Nicholas panel
consisted of Judges Alito, McKee and Fullam. Judge Fullam, a Senior Judge of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was sitting by
designation.
49
In addition to Judge Alito, the Khodara panel consisted of Judges Stapleton and
Pollack. Judge Pollack, a Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, was sitting by designation.
50
Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2001).
51
Woodwind Estates Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2000).
52
United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 40607 (3d Cir. 2003) (Cowen, J. dissenting).
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round hole. Yet, under the Majority opinion, it is with this
awkward analogy that our district courts will now struggle. The
confusion and potential for disparate results across the districts
will haunt us for years to come.53

A post-United Artists district court opinion further highlights the
difficulty in applying the “police chase” standard in the land use context.
In Levin v. Upper Makefield Tp., the court stated that “Lewis addressed
the substantive due process culpability of a law enforcement officer [in
exigent circumstances which resulted in death] and therefore could
conceivably be distinguishable from other species of substantive due
process claims,” such as in the land use context.54 In fact, in Fuentes v.
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2000), a post-Lewis decision, the Third
Circuit acknowledged this distinction, stating that the “shocks the
conscience” test “may only apply” to law enforcement officers in exigent
circumstances because “[t]he [Lewis] Court’s analysis of the police
[chase] clarifies that the “shocks the conscience” standard of culpability
applies in those instances where the police officer must instantaneously
respond to a situation without opportunity for reflection on his or her
actions.” 55
3. The Third Circuit’s Inconsistent Application
The Levin court pointed out the difficulty in applying the “shocks
the conscience” test in the land use context, stating: “[w]e are only
guided by rough contours” because “the Supreme Court has not provided
a precise formula for determining what actions specifically constitute
conscience shocking behavior.”56 As a result of the difficultly in applying
this somewhat vague standard, courts within the Third Circuit have
reached inconsistent decisions of what is conscience shocking.
For example, in some applications of the test, the district courts
have concluded that situations which typically constituted a “deliberate
indifference” constitute “conscience shocking” conduct.57 In Nicolette v.
53
54

Id.
Levin v. Upper Makefield Township, 2003 WL 21652301 at *5 n.15 (E.D. Pa.

2003).
55

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 348 (3d Cir. 2000) (Mansman, Greenberg and
McKee, JJ.) (emphasis added) (concluding that the “shocks the conscience” test applies
in a prison riot situation because, similar to the police chase in Lewis, the officers have no
time to deliberate).
56
Levin, 2003 WL 21652301 at *8.
57
See Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (W.D. Pa. 2003); see also The
Development Group, LLC v. Franklin Township Board of Supervisors, 2003 WL
22358440 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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Caruso, the court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied the “shocks the
conscience” test where the plaintiff alleged that the township officials
engaged in a course of conduct designed to restrict plaintiff from
developing his property.58
The plaintiff in Nicolette was the owner of a business that disposed
of construction and demolition waste. After the plaintiff discontinued
waste disposal in the township, township officials allegedly embarked on
a “retaliatory campaign of unrelenting harassment and abuse,” by
selectively enforcing regulations against the plaintiff and arbitrarily
denying his plans to construct a parking facility, golf driving range and
recycling facility.59 The plaintiff claimed to have spent thousands of
dollars in attempting to comply with the township’s requests regarding
the projects.60 The court accepted, for purposes of summary judgment,
that the township officials had engaged in a “course of conduct designed
to restrict plaintiff from developing the property he leased,” which
sufficiently implicated the “shocks the conscience” test.61
Similarly, in The Development Group, the district court concluded
that the plaintiffs satisfied the “shocks the conscience” test on a motion
to dismiss where they pled that “Defendants gave contradictory
indications about what kind of submission would be approved, attempted
to persuade Plaintiffs to withdraw the submissions through unlawful
means, and caused Plaintiffs to incur great expense in revising the
plans.”62
However, in other applications of the test, courts in the Third
Circuit have upheld a more restrictive standard that appears to lessen the
protection that individuals had against arbitrary government conduct
under the “arbitrary or improper motive” test.63 For instance, in Levin,
the district court found that: (1) the township intentionally delayed the
issuance of a final building permit to the plaintiff, even after the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on the township’s appeals;
(2) the township’s act of cashing plaintiff’s permit fee before issuance of
any of the permits was “dubious”; and (3) that the township officials’
proposed ordinance was drafted with the sole intent of restricting the
plaintiff from building on his property.64 Although this conduct likely
58

Nicolette, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
Id. at 715.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 723.
62
The Development Group, LLC, 2003 WL 22358440 at *6.
63
Levin, 2003 WL 21652301 at *8; Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d
457, 465-67 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
64
Levin, 2003 WL 21652301 at *9.
59

112

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:101

would have satisfied the “arbitrary or improper motive” test, the court
held that it was insufficient to satisfy the “shocks the conscience” test.65
The court summarily concluded that “[t]his chain of events strongly
points to a bad motive and purposeful intention to delay issuing the
Plaintiff a building permit, but it does not foster a finding that
Defendants’ behavior shocked-the-conscience.”66
Another district court applied a similarly harsh standard in Corneal,
concluding that “the totality of the facts, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the [plaintiffs], establishes that the Board may have acted
with [improper] motives . . . related to illegitimate personal animus. This
is not enough to establish a violation of substantive due process [under
the new standard].”67
C. Applicable Land Use Review Standards in Other Circuits
Given the inconsistency within the Third Circuit of the “shocks the
conscience” test, the impact of the new test remains uncertain. Some
guidance is provided in reviewing decisions in other circuits, although
the majority of circuits continue to apply the “arbitrary or improper
motive” test. Only two other circuits have adopted the “shocks the
conscience” test and, of these two, one circuit’s application appears to
gravitate toward the “arbitrary or improper motive” test.
1. Most Circuits Continue to Apply the “Arbitrary or Improper
Motive” Test
After the Supreme Court’s issuance of Lewis, it appears that most
circuits have concluded that Lewis does not mandate the application of
the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use context. For example,
prior to Lewis, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the “shocks the
conscience” test in the land use context, stating:
Not only are there fewer instances in case law, but the “shock the
conscience” test is not as uniformly applied to cases where
excessive force or physical brutality is not the basis of the claim.
The “shocks the conscience” standard, fuzzy under the best of
circumstances, becomes fuzzy beyond a court’s power to
interpret objectively where there is a dearth of previous decisions
on which to base the standard. We doubt the utility of such a
standard outside the realm of physical abuse, an area in which the
65
66
67

Id.
Id.
Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
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consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of
uniformity.68

After Lewis, the Sixth Circuit continued to apply the “arbitrary or
improper motive” test, concluding that “citizens have a substantive due
process right not to be subjected to arbitrary or irrational zoning
decisions.”69
Similarly, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits have
apparently concluded that Lewis does not mandate the application of the
“shocks the conscience” test in the land use context because each of
these circuits issued decisions subsequent to Lewis by which each
refrained from applying the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use
context. For example, to determine the deprivation of substantive due
process in the land use context subsequent to Lewis, the Fourth Circuit
applied an “arbitrary and irrational” test;70 the Fifth Circuit applied an
“arbitrary or capricious” test;71 the Seventh Circuit applied an “arbitrary
and unreasonable” test;72 the Tenth Circuit concluded that if there was a
property interest, the claim was ripe and not subsumed within the
Takings Clause, an “arbitrary” test would apply;73 and the D.C. Circuit
has defined the substantive due process test as “grave unfairness” or
“egregious government misconduct,” not conscience shocking.74

68

Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1990).
Tri-Corp Mgmt. Co. v. Praznik, 33 Fed. Appx. 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Bowers v. City of Flint, 325 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the “arbitrary
or improper motive” test is the appropriate standard in the land use context because it
“[i]s simply another formulation” of the “traditional ‘shocks the conscience’” test).
70
Tri-County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe County, 281 F.3d 430, 440 (4th Cir. 2002).
71
Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 253 (5th Cir. 2000).
72
Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998).
73
Signature Props. Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th
Cir. 2002).
74
George Washington Univ. v. Dist. of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (concluding that the “substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or
group animus” constitutes a substantive due process violation).
69
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2. A Minority of Circuits Apply the “Shocks the Conscience” Test75
Only the First, Second and Third Circuits hold that the “shocks the
conscience” test is the appropriate standard to determine a section 1983
violation in the land use context.76 However, of these three circuits, only
the Second and Third Circuits replaced their respective “arbitrary or
improper motive” tests with the “shocks the conscience” test after
concluding that Lewis mandated the application of the “shocks the
conscience” test.77 The First Circuit, on the other hand, applied the
“shocks the conscience” test as early as 1982, well before Lewis.78
Indeed, in 1988, ten years prior to Lewis, while deciding the appropriate
test to determine the deprivation of substantive due process in the land
use context, the Third Circuit considered and rejected the First Circuit’s

75

The Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have not been included as either circuits
that apply or refuse to apply the “shocks the conscience” test for the following two
reasons. First, it is unclear which test the Eighth Circuit applies because it has not
expressly adopted the “shocks the conscience” test and in a recent case has concluded
that, under Lewis, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference (“arbitrary or
improper motive”) test to non-exigent situations where the state actor had time to
deliberate. Terrell v. Larson, 371 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying the deliberate
indifference standard where a police officer had time to deliberate before acting).
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently granted a rehearing en
banc and vacated the Terrell opinion. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2005).
Second, neither the Ninth or Eleventh Circuits reach the application of the standard. The
Ninth Circuit does not reach the application of the standard because, in the Ninth Circuit,
claims for substantive due process violations are barred by the Graham Doctrine which
provides that a plaintiff cannot assert substantive due process claims instead of, or in
addition to, takings claims. Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Circuit does not reach the standard because it recently concluded that
“constitutional due process is satisfied … when proper procedures are employed.”
Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mt. Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
Note that prior to this decision, the Eleventh Circuit had traditionally applied the
“arbitrary or improper motive” test to substantive due process claims. Greenbriar Ltd. v.
City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989).
76
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir. 1982);
Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999); United Artists Theatre
Circuit v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003).
77
Compare United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400 (expressly following Lewis in applying
the “shocks the conscience” test which overruled Third Circuit precedent that previously
applied the “arbitrary or improper motive” test), and Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170
F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999) (expressly following Lewis by overruling Second Circuit
precedent that previously applied an “arbitrary or irrational” test), with Southview Assoc.,
Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992) (pre-Lewis precedent by which the Second
Circuit applied the “arbitrary or improper motive” test).
78
Estabrook, 680 F.2d at 832.
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“shocks the conscience” test and concluded that the “arbitrary or
improper motive” test was the appropriate test in the land use context.79
3. The First and Second Circuits’ Inconsistent Application of the
“Shocks the Conscience” Test
Similar to the Third Circuit’s inconsistent application of the
“shocks the conscience” test, the First and Second Circuits have
inconsistently applied the test because the First Circuit’s application
creates a more stringent standard while the Second Circuit’s application
parallels the “arbitrary or improper motive” test.
Consistent with the Third Circuit’s decisions in Corneal and Levin,
the First Circuit took a very stringent approach that appears to lessen the
protection that individuals have against arbitrary government conduct.80
Indeed, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the Due Process Clause was intended to secure individuals from the
arbitrary exercise of state action, the First Circuit concluded that even if
the state action is arbitrary, there is no violation unless the conduct is
“shocking or violative of universal standards of decency.”81
For example, in Collins, the First Circuit expressly concluded that
regardless of whether state action may have been arbitrary, there is no
violation of substantive due process in the land use context unless the
conduct is “truly horrendous.”82 The Collins court concluded that
evidence that a zoning board member’s rejection of the plaintiff’s
application was motivated by personal animus did not constitute
“conscience-shocking” behavior and thus, was not a violation of
substantive due process.83
The First Circuit has consistently applied this stringent standard.
For instance, the First Circuit concluded that the denial of an application
for approval of a development plan in contravention of state statute;84 the

79
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988); see DeMutis v. Borough of
Phoenixville, 1990 WL 96100 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (acknowledging that “[t]he court in Bello
did not follow the approach of the First Circuit.”).
80
Compare Estabrook, 680 F.2d at 832, and Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349-50
(1st Cir. 1994), and Nestor Colon Medina & Successors, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32,
45 (1st Cir. 1992), and PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir.
1991), with Levin v. Upper Makefield Township, 2003 WL 21652301 at *8 n.15 (E.D.
Pa. 2003), and Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
81
Collins v. Nuzzo, 244 F.3d 246, 250-51 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Amsden v.
Moran, 904 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1990).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
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revocation of a special permit out of animus toward the plaintiff;85 the
denial of a permit in retaliation for plaintiff’s political views86 and the
denial of an application for approval of construction drawings in
violation of agency regulations87 do not constitute conscience shocking
behavior.
Unlike the First Circuit and similar to the Third Circuit’s decisions
in Nicolette and Development Group, a district court in the Second
Circuit concluded that situations which typically constitute arbitrary or
improperly motivated conduct constitute “conscience shocking”
conduct.88 For example, the Second Circuit concluded that, under the
“shocks the conscience” test, the plaintiffs stated a claim for the
deprivation of substantive due process where the plaintiffs alleged that
the denial of the permit was improperly motivated.89
In T.S. Haulers, the plaintiff purchased unimproved property in an
industrially zoned district.90 The plaintiffs applied for a special permit to
operate a non-nuisance industry, which would allow them to operate a
sand mining facility.91 The town denied the permit allegedly under
“political pressure from various civil and environmental associations that
are opposed to sand mining.”92 The plaintiffs then obtained a permit from
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, which
allegedly foreclosed the town’s ability to deny the use of the land for
mining.93 In response, the town amended its Code to prohibit sand
mining in the area in which the plaintiffs’ property was located.94 In
ruling on the town’s motion to dismiss, the district court found that
because the town denied the plaintiffs’ application for a special permit
due to political pressure from environmental and conservation groups
and amended its Code to specifically exclude the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs

85
86

Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1994).
Nestor Colon Medina & Successors, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir.

1992).
87

PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1991).
Compare T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead, 190 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D.N.Y.
2002), with Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (W.D. Pa. 2003), and The
Development Group, LLC v. Franklin Township Board of Supervisors, 2003 WL
22358440 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
89
See T.S. Haulers, 190 F. Supp. 2d 455.
90
Id. at 456-57.
91
Id. at 457.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
88
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had alleged a denial of substantive due process sufficient to withstand the
motion to dismiss.95
III. CONCLUSION
The rationale set forth in United Artists may lend itself to critical
reevaluation because, as the dissenting opinion suggested, land use
decisions are deliberate in nature and not issued in exigent circumstances
such as the police chase discussed in Lewis. Furthermore, given the
varying results of the application of the “shocks the conscience” test, one
is unable to determine whether the “shocks the conscience” test is, as
Nicolette, Development Group and a district court in the Second Circuit
suggest, simply a dressed-up “arbitrary or improper motive” test or, as
Levin, Corneal and the First Circuit suggest, a more stringent test
affording less protection against arbitrary government action.96
If the “shocks the conscience” test is construed to create a more
stringent test, permitting arbitrary government conduct to proceed
unchecked unless the conduct is deemed “conscience shocking,” the new
test may be challenged as being inconsistent with the historically stated
principles of substantive due process protection. The U.S. Supreme Court
said that, “[h]istorically, this guarantee of due process has been applied
to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of
life, liberty, or property.”97 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the “[the Due Process Clause] was intended to secure individuals
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”98 Indeed, in
Lewis, the Court stressed the intent of the Due Process Clause when
determining to apply the “shocks the conscience” test in the police-chase
context, stating that “[s]ince the time of our early explanations of due
process, we have understood the core of the concept to be protection
against arbitrary action.”99 Clearly, a deliberate decision indifferent to
the law by a governmental official sworn to uphold the law should
constitute “an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” and thus
violate the Due Process Clause regardless of the fact that it may not be

95

Id. at 462.
Compare Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 722-23 (W.D. Pa. 2003), and The
Development Group, LLC v. Franklin Township Board of Supervisors, 2003 WL
22358440 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003), with Levin v. Upper Makefield Township, 2003 WL
21652301 at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2003), and Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457,
468 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
97
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
99
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (emphasis added).
96
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“conscience shocking” because people have become desensitized to
corrupt and/or arbitrary government action.100
The ultimate application of United Artists and its “shocks the
conscience” test likely will remain uncertain until the Third Circuit or the
U.S. Supreme Court provide clarification by determining that: (1) the
extension of the “shocks the conscious” standard in the land use context
was inappropriate given the vastly differing circumstances surrounding
police chases and land use development deliberations; (2) the “shocks the
conscience” test in the land use context is nothing more than a
heightened “arbitrary or improper motive” test; or (3) the “shocks the
conscience test” is a more stringent test which can also be reconciled
with the historic principles of substantive due process protection.
Until such a clarification is provided, either through expressed legal
standards or a case-by-case analysis of various factual circumstances, the
courts likely will struggle with determining exactly what federal
protections are afforded to property owners and land developers from
arbitrary government conduct.

100

The potential vagueness of the standard also may create vastly different standards
within the same region, because what “shocks the conscience” in one municipality may
be considered routine behavior in another. Ironically, the more nefarious a government’s
reputation, the more immune it may be from challenge.

